TAILIEUCHUNG - The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions

It has long been acknowledged that politics and regulatory capture can play an important role in dealing with financial institutions’ distress. The East Asia financial crisis meant a large number of distressed and closed intermediaries in an environment with many links between government, supervisors, politicians and financial institutions. This makes for a good event for studying how such connections affect the resolution of financial institutions’ distress. We investigate the occurrence of distress and closure decisions for. | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions by Paola Bonginf Stijn ClaessensJ and Giovanni Ferr Abstract It has long been acknowledged that politics and regulatory capture can play an important role in dealing with financial institutions distress. The East Asia financial crisis meant a large number of distressed and closed intermediaries in an environment with many links between government supervisors politicians and financial institutions. This makes for a good event for studying how such connections affect the resolution of financial institutions distress. We investigate the occurrence of distress and closure decisions for 186 banks and 97 nonbank financial institutions from Indonesia Korea Malaysia the Philippines and Thailand. We find that 42 percent of the institutions experienced distress after July 1997. By July 1999 13 percent of all institutions in existence in July 1997 had been closed. Using 1996 financial data we find that traditional CAMEL-type variables loan loss reserves to capital loan growth net interest income to total income return on assets and loans to borrowings help predict subsequent distress and closure. None of the foreign controlled institutions was closed and the degree of foreign portfolio ownership lowered an institution s probability of distress. Connections with industrial groups or influential families increased the probability of distress suggesting that supervisors had granted selective prior forbearance from prudential regulations. Connections made closure more not less likely however suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. Larger institutions were more likely distressed but less likely closed while smaller nonbank financial institutions were more likely closed suggesting a Too Big To Fail policy. These policies together with the fact that resolution processes were late and not necessarily comprehensive may have added to the overall uncertainty and loss of confidence in the .

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