TAILIEUCHUNG - Electoral cycles in savings bank lending

African countries have a choice between establishing an agricultural sector founded on broad-based ownership of medium-size farms (much larger than those currently operated and expanding over time) or a dual structure where a few mega farms coexist with many small producers. Given the long-term impacts associated with such choices, clear elaboration of the issues in an informed public debate about the development paths open to a country is needed. In contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America is characterized by greater variation in availability of area for expansion, yield gaps, and area cultivated per rural individual (figure 3).Area cultivated per rural inhabitant ranges from ha in Haiti to ha. | Electoral cycles in savings bank lending Florian Englmaiery Till Stowasserz September 22 2012 Abstract We provide causal evidence that German savings banks systematically adjust their lending policies in response to local electoral cycles. We exploit a peculiarity in the German public banking system where county politicians are by law involved in the management of local savings banks. The different timing of county elections across states and the existence of a control group of cooperative banks - that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political connectedness - allow for clean identification of causal effects of county elections on savings banks lending behavior. These effects are economically meaningful and very robust to various specifications. Moreover we find that politically induced lending is more pronounced the more entrenched the incumbent party and the more contested the upcoming election. This shows that in the absence of actual political competition inefficient political tinkering is possible even in a strong institutional environment. Keywords Bank lending cycles political business cycles political connectedness public banks government ownership of firms JEL classification G21 D72 D73 We are grateful to Daniel Carvalho Georg Gebhardt Dirk Jenter Francis Kramarz David Laibson Monika Schnitzer Andrei Shleifer Joachim Winter and seminar audiences at UCLA the University of Munich the 2012 Royal Economic Society Conference in Cambridge the 2012 European Economic Association Conference in Malaga and the 2012 American Law and Economics Conference in Stanford for comments and suggestions. Quirin Hausmann Thomas Hattenbach Nikolaos Karygiannis Johannes Kummel and Kirill Lindt provided excellent research assistance. This research was partially funded through DFG grant SFB TR-15. University of Wurzburg University of Wurzburg 1 Introduction Government control over enterprises is .

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