TAILIEUCHUNG - Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations

Most of the central transit area is floored with the exotic types of wood known as paduk, merbau and jatoba, that come from South-East Asia and the West Indies. The first wooden floor in the airport was laid in 1960 in the then brand new Terminal 2. This type of wooden flooring has since become the preferred flooring in many of the new buildings in the airport and creates a warm contrast to the glass, aluminium and steel. These woods, whose orange and red-brown hues almost shimmer in the light, are very suitable for building purposes, inside and out. Apart from being beautiful to the eye, they are also. | dialectica 2007 pp. 417-446 DOI Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations Fabian Dorsch1 Abstract Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation it has a long tradition and is still very common to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on or even constituted by certain of our emotional responses to the objects concerned. Such a view faces however the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot accept and accommodate this possibility without thereby undermining the assumed capacity of emotions to justify corresponding aesthetic evaluations - that is without undermining the very sentimentalist idea at the core of its account. And I will also try to show that sentimentalists can hope to deny the possibility of faultless disagreement only by giving up the further view that aesthetic assessments are intersubjective - a view which is almost as traditional and widely held in aesthetics as sentimentalism and which is indeed often enough combined with the latter. My ultimate conclusion is therefore that this popular combination of views should better be avoided either sentimentalism or intersubjectivism has to make way. Introduction 1. Emotions can possibly stand in two kinds of rational relations they can be supported by reasons such as judgements or facts concerned with the non-evaluative nature of objects and they can themselves provide reasons for instance for belief or action. My main concern in this essay is with a certain aspect of the latter namely the capacity or lack thereof of emotions or sentiments to epistem-ically justify aesthetic evaluations that is ascriptions of aesthetic values to objects. That is I will be concerned with epistemological issues

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