TAILIEUCHUNG - Working PaPer SerieS no 967 / november 2008: Central bank miSPerCePtions and the role of money in interest rate rules

Governments The . Treasury and state and local governments raise large sums in the money market. The Treasury raises funds in the money market by selling short-term obligations of the . government called Treasury bills. Bills have the largest volume outstanding and the most active secondary market of any money market instrument. Because bills are generally considered to be free of default risk, while other money market instruments have some default risk, bills typically have the lowest interest rate at a given maturity. State and local governments raise funds in the money market through the sale of. | EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK EUROSYSTEM NO 967 I NOVEMBER 2008 WORKING PAPER SERIES by Gunter W. Beck and Volker Wieland CENTRAL BANK MISPERCEPTIONS AND THE ROLE OF MONEY I IN INTEREST RATE RULES EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK EUROSYSTEM In 2008 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the 10 banknote. WORKING PAPER SERIES NO 967 I NOVEMBER 2008 CENTRAL BANK MISPERCEPTIONS AND THE ROLE OF MONEY IN INTEREST RATE RULES 1 by Gunter W. Beck 3 and Volker Wieland 2 This paper can be downloaded without charge from http or from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at http abstract_id 1295987. Ì Wieland thanks the European Central Bank that he visited as Wim Duisenberg Research Fellow and the Stanford Center for International Development for the hospitality extended while part of this research was accomplished. Furthermore we thank Athanasios Orphanides for providing his data on historical . output gap revisions and Christina Gerberding for the Bundesbank s real-time data set with output gap revisions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on John Taylor s Contributions to Monetary Theory and Policy at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas October 2007. We have also benefited from seminar presentations at . Santa Cruz . Davis FU Berlin Birkbeck College the European Central Bank the Kiel Institute as well conferences at the Bundesbank the University of Cambridge and the Center for Financial Studies. We would also like to thank Ignazio Angeloni Joshua Aizenman John Driffill Tim Cogley Alex Cukierman Mark Gertler Stefan Gerlach Robert Hall Otmar Issing Robert Lucas Ronald McKinnon John B. Taylor Peter Tinsley Carl Walsh John C. Williams and Michael Woodford for useful comments. All remaining errors are our own and the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. 2 Corresponding author. Contact Professur fur Geldtheorie und -politik Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe .

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