TAILIEUCHUNG - The Client is King: Do Mutual Fund Relationships Bias Analyst Recommendations? 

This is a good time for a review of the academic literature on evaluating portfolio performance, concentrating on professionally managed invest- ment portfolios. While the literature goes back to before the 1960s, recent years have witnessed an explosion of new methods for perfor- mance evaluation and new evidence on the subject. We think that several forces have contributed to this renaissance. The demand for research on managed portfolio performance increased as mutual funds and related investment vehicles became more important to investors in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, equity investment became widely popular, as 401(k) and other defined-contribution investment plans began to dominate defined-benefit plans in the United. | The Client is King Do Mutual Fund Relationships Bias Analyst Recommendations Michael Firth Chen Lin Lingnan University Hong Kong Chinese University of Hong Kong Ping Liu Yuhai Xuan University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Harvard Business School Forthcoming Journal of Accounting Research Abstract This article investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell-side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds we find that an analyst s recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst s brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client s portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However this favorable recommendation bias towards a client s existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and in the long run for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business-related analysts. In addition we find that subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure. We thank an anonymous referee Malcolm Baker Murillo Campello Lauren Cohen Ben Esty Paul Gompers Paul Malatesta Christopher Malloy Paul McGuinness Jeffrey Pontiff Winnie Poon Jeremy Stein Michael Weisbach Sonia Wong Karen .

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