TAILIEUCHUNG - Accounting conservatism and managerial excess perks

This paper sheds light on the relationship between accounting conservatism and managerial excess perks. In general, there are two views about managerial perks, agency cost view and management incentive view. Under the assumption that considers managerial perks as agency costs, the abnormal managerial perks erode the value of firms. | http afr. Accounting and Finance Research Vol. 8 No. 2 2019 Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Excess Perks Han Li1 1 SILC Business School Shanghai University Shanghai China Correspondence Han Li SILC Business School Shanghai University 20 Chengzhong Road JiaDing District Shanghai 201800 China. Tel 86-21-6998-0028 Received February 11 2019 Accepted March 4 2019 Online Published March 11 2019 doi URL https Abstract This paper sheds light on the relationship between accounting conservatism and managerial excess perks. In general there are two views about managerial perks agency cost view and management incentive view. Under the assumption that considers managerial perks as agency costs the abnormal managerial perks erode the value of firms. Accounting conservatism can significantly restrict the managerial excess perks. Due to the strict compensation regulation in China s SOEs the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess perks in China s SOEs is stronger than in non-SOEs. Further in the robustness tests this paper finds that negative relationship is stronger in the firms of lower level accounting conservatism or higher level financial leverage. Keywords conservatism perquisites earnings management managerial behaviour 1. Introduction Managerial perks are defined as forms of nonmonetary compensation to selected employees Rajan and Wulf 2006 . Different with explicit compensation such as salary bonus etc. managerial perks as implicit compensation are not easily observed. Therefore managerial perks sometimes are used as the manipulated accounting tools by some managers in order to increase or decrease the firms earnings. In the prior researches there are two mainstream theories for explaining the managerial perks. One is agency cost view the other is incentive scheme view. For the agency cost view managerial excess perks are the proofs of agency problems that the .

• Kế toán - Kiểm toán
• Earnings management
• Managerial behaviour
• Abnormal managerial perks
• Managerial perks
• Agency cost
• Banking earnings management
• Accrual earnings management
• Loan loss provisions
• Jones model
• Modified jones model
• Loan loss provisions earnings management
• Earnings quality
• Dividend policy
• Frontier market
• Earnings quality in Vietnam
• Accounting undergraduate Honors theses
• The effect of CEO it expertise on the information environment
• Evidence from management earnings forecasts
• Management earnings forecasts
• Effective information technology
• Accrual based earnings management
• Real earnings management
• Sarbanes Oxley Act
• Information value
• Financial reporting
• CEO characteristics
• The US banking industry
• Impact of CEO characteristics
• Family ownership concentration on the relationship
• The characteristics of board of directors and earnings management
• Directors and earnings management
• Family Ownership Concentration
• Board of Directors Characteristics
• Listed firms
• Modified Jones Model listed firms
• Listed firms in Vietnam
• Earnings management behavior
• International Conference on Emerging Challenges
• Accounting comparability
• Accruals earnings management
• Frontier markets
• Reasonable value
• Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange
• Corporate performance
• Detecting earnings management
• Shared medical systems
• Earnings smoothing
• Sample questions
• Class handouts
• The role analysis of accrual management
• Loss loan provision factor
• Fair value accounting to earnings volatility
• The Stock Exchange of Indonesia Website
• Indonesia Capital Market
• The accrual management role
• Kinh tế kinh doanh
• Tạp chí khoa học
• Top Executive Gender
• Vietnamese Listed Firms
• M score model
• Non financial listed companies
• Beneish model
• Sales growth index
• Depreciation index
• Corporate governance on earnings management of enterprises listed
• Hochiminh stock exchange
• Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange
• The CEO duality
• Corporate governance mechanism
• Corporate governance
• Enterprises listed
• Equity based compensation
• Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance coverage
• Equity based executive compensation
• Risk taking behavior
• Principles based standards
• Rules based standards
• IFRS adoption
• Price efficiency
• Classification shifting
• Analyst coverage
• Monitoring factors
• Chief Financial Officer
• Financial reporting quality
• Discretionary accruals
• China SOX
• Internal control over financial reporting
• Non audit fees
• Big 4
• Panel data
• Institute of Chartered Accountant of India
• Banks listed in Tehran Stock Exchange
• Tehran Stock Exchange
• Risk management on earnings volatility
• Dichev and Tang
• Journal of Accounting and Economics
• Board characteristics
• Sri Lanka
• Total market capitalisation of CSE
• Highest market capitalisation
• Summary of Doctor thesis
• Summary of Doctor of Accounting thesis
• Factors related to corporate governance
• Vietnam stock market
• Finance accounting and Auditing
• Jones model (1991)
• Ownership structure
• Debt ratio
• Financial performance
• Stochastic frontier analysis
• Performance evaluation
• Banking industry