TAILIEUCHUNG - Lecture Personnel economics in practice - Chapter 10: Rewarding performance

After completing this chapter, you will be able to address the following questions: What does economics say about paying for performance? How do real world incentive plans differ from the economic ideal? What sort of results could one expect from a properly designed incentive scheme? Which settings are most appropriate for such schemes? What are the potential pitfalls to avoid in implementing a pay-for-performance system?. | Chapter 10: Rewarding Performance 4/8/2013 Chapter 10: Rewarding Performance How Strong Should Incentives Be? Intuition Selling the Job Taxicab Drivers Securities Traders Wait Staff in Restaurants Outsources Sales Middle Managers Imperfect Evaluations and Optimal Incentives Uncontrollable Risk Controllable Risk Manipulation Distortions and Multitask Incentives Summary: How Strong Should Incentives Be? Value of Employee Effort Importance of Sorting Controllable and Uncontrollable Risk Risk Aversion Trust and Subjectivity Distortion and Multitask Incentives Potential Manipulation Paying for Performance: Common Examples Rewards or Penalties? The Ratchet Effect Lump Sums, Demotions, or Promotions Caps on Rewards Applications Profit Sharing and ESOPs Performance Evaluation Pay-Performance Relationship Counterarguments Organizational Form and Contracting Franchising Cost Plus versus Fixed Fee Motivating Creativity Summary 4/8/2013 Introduction We now think about how to tie that evaluation

• Kinh tế học
• Personnel economics
• Kinh tế học
• Personnel economics in practice
• Rewarding performance
• Pay performance shape
• Performance pay methods
• Setting hiring standards
• Making decisions
• Imperfect information
• Screening job applicants
• Worker’s productivity
• Signaling more formally
• Investment in skills
• Investments in education
• On the job training
• Rent sharing
• Managing turnover
• Retention strategies
• Bidding for employees
• Decision making
• Benefits of centralization
• Benefits of decentralization
• Organizational structure
• Network structures
• Coordination mechanisms
• Job design
• Optimal job design
• Intrinsic motivation
• Advanced job design
• Group decision making
• Implementation of teams
• Performance evaluation
• Performance evaluation design
• Quantitative performance measures
• Career based incentives
• Outside hiring
• Promotion probability
• Employee stock options
• Incentive pay
• Executive pay
• Improving employee sorting
• Implementation of benefits
• Cafeteria plans
• Human capital investment
• Internal markets
• Motivating creativity
• Employment relationship
• Perfect competition
• Imperfect competition
• Complex contracting
• school administration
• personnel administration
• business management
• production management
• personnel management
• Political economy