TAILIEUCHUNG - Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Sequential Search

These estimates were obtained by asking respondents several questions about their current health insurance coverage. Separate questions were asked about Medicare, Wisconsin Medicaid, BadgerCare Plus, private health insurance, employer-sponsored health insurance and other kinds of health care coverage for each household member. Those without any current health care coverage were considered uninsured at the time of the interview. (See Table 5, page 18, for specific types of health insurance coverage.) The percent currently uninsured did not significantly change between 2007 (7%) and 2008 (8%). However, among children, the proportion uninsured at any point in time. | Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Sequential Search Robert Shimer Ivan Werning Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Chicago Massachusetts Institute of Technology July 16 2003 1 Introduction Unemployment insurance is an asset that protects workers against the risk of failing to find a job. Its provision is limited by an important moral hazard problem workers who are protected against unemployment risk remain unemployed for longer. A growing theoretical literature examines how optimal unemployment insurance deals with the tradeoff between insurance and moral hazard Shavell and Weiss 1979 Atkeson and Lucas 1995 Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997 Werning 2002 . For the most part this literature has ignored another important limitation of unemployment insurance it does not protect workers against uncertainty regarding the type of job that they find. This paper explores the optimal provision of unemployment insurance when post-unemployment wages are uncertain and cannot be observed by the insurance provider. We extend the McCall 1970 intertemporal job search model a basic workhorse in decision theory to allow for a risk-averse worker with constant absolute risk aversion CARA preferences. In each period the worker receives a single job offer drawn from a known wage distribution which she decides to accept or reject. If she accepts the job she earns this wage forever. If she rejects it she remains unemployed and draws another wage in the following period. We introduce a benevolent social planner who provides insurance against unemployment risk into this environment. The planner s goal is to maximize the worker s utility while providing actuarially fair insurance . his budget is balanced in expected present value terms. We consider several different information structures each of which offers the planner 1 increasingly little control over the worker s behavior. First we assume that he can observe whether she is employed or unemployed and he can .

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