TAILIEUCHUNG - A Companion to Urban Economics - Arnott and McMillen - Chapter 20

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y Strategic Interaction among Governments Strategic interaction among governments has recently become a major focus of theoretical and empirical work in public economics. One branch of the literature analyzes strategic interaction due to various kinds of “spillovers. | A Companion to Urban Economics Edited by Richard J. Arnott Daniel P. McMillen Copyright 2006 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd CHAPTER TWENTY Strategic Interaction among Governments Jan K. Brueckner Introduction Strategic interaction among governments has recently become a major focus of theoretical and empirical work in public economics. One branch of the literature analyzes strategic interaction due to various kinds of spillovers. For example in a model with pollution spillovers the preferred level of abatement in one jurisdiction depends on policies chosen elsewhere for a survey see Wilson 1996 . While other types of spillovers also lead to interaction a different mechanism is at work in tax competition models where governments levy taxes on a mobile tax base. Recognizing that their tax bases shrink as tax rates rise large jurisdictions choose their rates in strategic fashion with an eye on choices made elsewhere for a survey see Wilson 1999 . A related body of literature focuses on welfare competition analyzing income redistribution by state governments when the poor migrate in response to differentials in welfare benefits. In such models states choose benefit levels in strategic fashion taking account of the mobility of the poor and the choices of other jurisdictions for a survey see Brueckner 2000 . Spurred in part by these theoretical developments strategic interaction among governments is now the focus of a growing empirical literature. Most studies in this literature test for strategic interaction by estimating reaction functions which show how a jurisdiction responds to the choices of neighboring jurisdictions in setting the level of its own decision variable. If the estimated reaction function shows interdependence among policy choices the presence of strategic interaction is confirmed. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of conceptual issues in the theoretical and empirical literatures on strategic interaction. The discussion Strategic

TỪ KHÓA LIÊN QUAN
TÀI LIỆU MỚI ĐĂNG
41    172    5    26-11-2024
26    130    2    26-11-2024
TAILIEUCHUNG - Chia sẻ tài liệu không giới hạn
Địa chỉ : 444 Hoang Hoa Tham, Hanoi, Viet Nam
Website : tailieuchung.com
Email : tailieuchung20@gmail.com
Tailieuchung.com là thư viện tài liệu trực tuyến, nơi chia sẽ trao đổi hàng triệu tài liệu như luận văn đồ án, sách, giáo trình, đề thi.
Chúng tôi không chịu trách nhiệm liên quan đến các vấn đề bản quyền nội dung tài liệu được thành viên tự nguyện đăng tải lên, nếu phát hiện thấy tài liệu xấu hoặc tài liệu có bản quyền xin hãy email cho chúng tôi.
Đã phát hiện trình chặn quảng cáo AdBlock
Trang web này phụ thuộc vào doanh thu từ số lần hiển thị quảng cáo để tồn tại. Vui lòng tắt trình chặn quảng cáo của bạn hoặc tạm dừng tính năng chặn quảng cáo cho trang web này.