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The global financial crisis of 2007–09 was the result of a cascade of financial shocks that threw many economies off course. The economic damage has been extensive, with few countries spared – even those far from the source of the turmoil. As with many economic events, the impact has varied from country to country, from sector to sector, from firm to firm, and from person to person. China’s growth, for example, never dipped below 6% and Australia’s worst quarter was one with no growth. The economies of Japan, Mexico and the United Kingdom, however, suffered GDP contractions of 5–10% at. | WHY DID FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION DISAPPOINT Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian1 March 2008 I. Introduction A little over a decade ago just before the Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit the headlines there was an emerging consensus among leading macroeconomists that it was time for developing countries to embrace the liberalization of their capital accounts. In a famous speech during the IMF s Annual Meetings in 1997 Stanley Fischer put forth the case in favor of financial globalization and advocated an amendment to the IMF s articles the purpose of which would be to enable the Fund to promote the orderly liberalization of capital movements Fischer 1997 . Yes there were risks associated with opening up to capital flows but Fischer was convinced that these were more than offset by the potential benefits. Rudiger Dornbusch having written so eloquently and convincingly on the usefulness of financial transactions taxes just a short while ago Dornbusch 1996 now declared capital controls an idea whose time is past Dornbusch 1998 . He wrote The correct answer to the question of capital mobility is that it ought to be unrestricted Dornbusch 1998 20 . At the time that these ideas were being floated there was little systematic evidence that the theoretical benefits of capital flows would in fact be realized. One could look at the reduction in financing costs that accessing international markets enabled or the competitive gains from foreign bank presence as Fischer 1997 did and conclude that the gains were already visible. Or one could look at the still-fresh Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 and the Asian financial crisis which was brewing to conclude that the risks were too big to take on. Nonetheless so strong were the theoretical priors that one could presume as Fischer did 2003 14 that the evidence in favor of capital-account would cumulate over time just as with the evidence on the benefits of trade liberalization a couple of decades earlier.2 As Fischer had prophesied there
