Đang chuẩn bị nút TẢI XUỐNG, xin hãy chờ
Tải xuống
Since the global financial crisis began in 2007, there has been a lot of hand-wringing about the independence of central banks. Some commentators today would suggest that the recent large scale purchases of government bonds by central banks inherently represent a compromise of their independence from elected officials. Others will assert that the central banks which purchased private-sector securities, thereby jeopardizing their balance sheets and supposedly making political asset allocations, are the ones which have put their independence at risk. The recent emergency actions of the European Central Bank [ECB] as part of the European Union’s response to the Greek financial crisis have prompted a whole new. | ADAM S. POSEN EXTERNAL MEMBER MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE BANK OF ENGLAND AND SENIOR FELLOW PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS WHEN CENTRAL BANKS BUY BONDS INDEPENDENCE AND THE POWER TO SAY NO Barclays Capital 14th Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference New York 14 June 2010 WHEN CENTRAL BANKS BUY BONDS INDEPENDENCE AND THE POWER TO SAY NO Adam S. Posen1 Since the global financial crisis began in 2007 there has been a lot of hand-wringing about the independence of central banks. Some commentators today would suggest that the recent large scale purchases of government bonds by central banks inherently represent a compromise of their independence from elected officials. Others will assert that the central banks which purchased private-sector securities thereby jeopardizing their balance sheets and supposedly making political asset allocations are the ones which have put their independence at risk. The recent emergency actions of the European Central Bank ECB as part of the European Union s response to the Greek financial crisis have prompted a whole new round of recrimination and worry on the continent. An unfortunately sizable number of people seem to believe that central bank independence is largely a matter of reputation and that any apparent fraternization with or accommodation of debt issuers imperils that reputation. That supposed reputational damage is then presumed to have significant costs for central banks counter-inflationary credibility. I am not one of those people and I will try with my brief remarks today to persuade you that this set of beliefs is wrong on all counts. Central bank independence is not primarily a matter of reputation but of reality - what matters is what central banks do not whether they maintain an appearance of public disdain towards the messy realities of economic life. The substance of central bank independence is giving monetary policy setting committees the legal autonomy to refuse demands to purchase debt .
