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One strength of the sample is that the microfinance institutions have been selected based in large part on their ability to deliver quality data. A disadvantage is that participation in the database is voluntary. (Grameen Bank, for example, chose not to participate during our sample period.) The data set is thus not representative of all microfinance institutions, and the sample is skewed toward institutions that have stressed financial objectives and profitability. However, the institutions collectively serve a large fraction of microfinance customers worldwide, and the set favors the institutions best-positioned to meet the promise of microfinance. | Central Bank Balances and Reserve Requirements Simon Gray INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 2011 International Monetary Fund WP 11 36 IMF Working Paper Monetary and Capital Markets Department Central Bank Balances and Reserve Requirements Prepared by Simon Gray Authorized for distribution by Karl Habermeier February 2011 Abstract Most central banks oblige depository institutions to hold minimum reserves against their liabilities predominantly in the form of balances at the central bank. The role of these reserve requirements has evolved significantly over time. The overlay of changing purposes and practices has the result that it is not always fully clear what the current purpose of reserve requirements is and this necessarily complicates thinking about how a reserve regime should be structured. This paper describes three main purposes for reserve requirements - prudential monetary control and liquidity management - and suggests best practice for the structure of a reserves regime. Finally the paper illustrates current practices using a 2010 IMF survey of 121 central banks. JEL Classification Numbers E5 E51 and E58. Keywords Reserve requirements central bank monetary control remuneration of reserves Author s E-Mail Address sgray@imf.org This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author s and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author s and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 2 Contents Page Abstract.2 Glossary.4 I. Introduction.5 II. The Purpose of Reserve Requirements.7 A. Prudential.7 B. Monetary Control.10 C. Liquidity Management.13 III. Reserves Remuneration as a Policy Signal.15 IV. Recent Trends.19 V. Technical Issues.20 A. The Reserve Requirement Base.21 B. Should Reserve Requirements Rates be Uniform .24 C. How Should Reserve Requirements be Held .27 D. Remuneration .31 E.
