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The ultimate responsibility for prudential standard-setting and supervision for Tier 1 FHCs must rest with a single regulator. The public has a right to expect that a clearly identifiable entity, not a committee of multiple agencies, will be answerable for setting standards that will protect the financial system and the public from risks posed by the potential failure of Tier 1 FHCs. Moreover, a committee that included regulators of specific types of financial institutions such as commercial banks or broker-dealers (functional regulators) may be less focused on systemic needs and more focused on the needs of the financial. | FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM A NEW FOUNDATION Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Financial Regulatory Reform A New Foundation Table of Contents Introduction.2 Summary of Recommendations.10 I. Promote Robust Supervision and Regulation of Financial Firms.19 II. Establish Comprehensive Regulation of Financial Markets.43 III. Protect Consumers and Investors from Financial Abuse.55 IV. Provide the Government with the Tools it Needs to Manage Financial Crises .76 V. Raise International Regulatory Standards and Improve International Cooperation .80 1 Financial Regulatory Reform A New Foundation Introduction Over the past two years we have faced the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. Americans across the nation are struggling with unemployment failing businesses falling home prices and declining savings. These challenges have forced the government to take extraordinary measures to revive our financial system so that people can access loans to buy a car or home pay for a child s education or finance a business. The roots of this crisis go back decades. Years without a serious economic recession bred complacency among financial intermediaries and investors. Financial challenges such as the near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management and the Asian Financial Crisis had minimal impact on economic growth in the U.S. which bred exaggerated expectations about the resilience of our financial markets and firms. Rising asset prices particularly in housing hid weak credit underwriting standards and masked the growing leverage throughout the system. At some of our most sophisticated financial firms risk management systems did not keep pace with the complexity of new financial products. The lack of transparency and standards in markets for securitized loans helped to weaken underwriting standards. Market discipline broke down as investors relied excessively on credit rating agencies. Compensation practices throughout the .