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nghiên cứu tỷ lệ thất nghiệp. Bester sử dụng mô hình của ông để thay thế cho giai đoạn thiết lập giá của mô hình cạnh tranh không gian Hotelling. Bester (1988a) có liên quan, mục đích là để giải thích sự phụ thuộc của giá về chất lượng. Bà Casella và Feinstein (1990, 1992) | 188 Chapter 9. The Role of the Trading Procedure Shaked and Sutton 1984a and Bester 1989a study variations of the model in Section 9.4.1 in which the delay before the seller can make an offer to a new buyer may differ from the delay between any two successive periods of bargaining. See also Muthoo 1993 . Shaked and Sutton use their model in which a firm bargains with two workers to study unemployment. Bester uses his model to replace the price-setting stage of Hotelling s model of spatial competition. Bester 1988a is related the aim is to explain the dependence of price on quality. Casella and Feinstein 1990 1992 study a model in which the desire of a seller to move to a new buyer arises because inflation reduces the real value of the monetary holdings of her existing partner relative to that of a fresh buyer. Peters 1988 studies a model that contains elements from the models of Sections 9.3 and 9.4. Sellers post prices but a buyer who is matched with a seller has the option of making a counteroffer the seller can accept this offer reject it and continue bargaining or terminate the match. When excess demand is small posted prices are accepted in equilibrium when it is large they are not. The limit of the equilibrium outcome as the common discount factor approaches 1 is different from the competitive outcome. Peters 1989 studies a model in which in each period each seller chooses the trading rule she will use i.e. the game that she will play with the buyer with whom she is matched. He shows that equilibrium trading rules lead to outcomes close to the competitive one. The results of Gul 1989 are more general than those in Section 9.5. For a distinct but related implementation of the Shapley value see Dow 1989 . A steady-state model in which some agents are middlemen who buy from sellers and resell to buyers and do not themselves consume the good is studied by Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987 . CHAPTER 10 The Role of Anonymity 10.1 Introduction In this chapter we study .
