TAILIEUCHUNG - Imperfect UnIon Representationand Taxationin Multilevel Governments

this book offers the first political theory of special-purpose jurisdictions, including 35,000 special districts and 13,500 school districts, which consti- tute the most common form of local government in the United States today. collectively, special-purpose governments have more civilian employees than the federal government and spend more than all city governments combined. the proliferation of special-purpose jurisdictions has fundamentally altered the nature of representation and taxation in local government. citizens today are commonly represented by dozens—in some cases hundreds—of local offi- cials in multiple layers of government. As a result, political participation in local elections is low, and special interest groups associated. | IMPERFECT __UNION MBMB fc. uiaaiaiB BBM Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments c BEfcABl IE . LL 13 2mBBBBBBLL LL_ Christopher R. Berry JJHBBBB1BBBLI m K I Cambridgi or g 9780521764735 This page intentionally left blank IMPERFECT UNION REPRESENTATION AND TAXATION IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNMENTS This book offers the first political theory of special-purpose jurisdictions including 35 000 special districts and 13 500 school districts which constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. Collectively special-purpose governments have more civilian employees than the federal government and spend more than all city governments combined. The proliferation of special-purpose jurisdictions has fundamentally altered the nature of representation and taxation in local government. Citizens today are commonly represented by dozens in some cases hundreds of local officials in multiple layers of government. As a result political participation in local elections is low and special interest groups associated with each function exert disproportionate influence. With multiple special interest governments tapping the same tax base it takes on the character of a common-pool resource leading to familiar problems of overexploitation. Strong political parties can often mitigate the common-pool problem by informally coordinating the policies of multiple overlapping governments. Christopher R. Berry is an assistant professor in the Harris School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. Previously he was a postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard University in the Department of Government. Professor Berry received his . from Vassar College Master of Regional Planning . from Cornell University and . from the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He was a Charles E. Merriam Fellow at the University of .

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