TAILIEUCHUNG - Inside the Crisis - An Empirical Analysis of Banking Systems in Distress

The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 argues that very high government debt/GDP ratios will increase uncertainty about the future path of interest rates. This will reduce the degree of asset substitutability between short-dated and long-dated paper, impairing the effectiveness of changes to the policy rate and making the short-term/long-term mix of government debt sales a more effective instrument of macroeconomic policy (Section 2). But the long-term interest rate on government bonds also has fundamental implications for financial stability (Section 3). Section 4 reviews the macroeconomics of debt maturity choices. There is no simple logical demarcation between. | Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Policy Research Working Paper 2431 Policy Research Working Paper 2431 Summary findings Much of the substantial literature on banking crises focuses on early warning indicators. Demirgiig-Kunt Detragiache and Gupta look at what happens to the economy and the banking sector after a banking crisis breaks out. Much of the theory of banking crises assigns a central role to depositor runs with vulnerability to runs viewed as a basic characteristic of banks as financial intermediaries. But banking systems can be financially distressed even when depositors do not withdraw their deposits if other bank creditors rush for the exit or if banks become insolvent. Are contemporary banking crises characterized by large declines in deposits The authors find that contemporary banking crises are not accompanied by declines in aggregate bank deposits and credit does not fall relative to output but the growth of both deposits and credit does slow down substantially. Output recovery begins the second year after the crisis and is not led by a resumption of credit growth. Instead banks including the stronger banks reallocate their asset portfolio away from loans. This suggests that protecting deposits during a banking crisis may not be enough to protect bank credit as lack of usable collateral and poor borrower creditworthiness discourage banks from lending. However protecting bank credit may not be a priority right after a crisis as the real economy can rebound without it at least while there is substantial underused capacity. This paper a joint product of Finance Development Research Group and the Research Department International Monetary Fund is part of a larger effort to study banking crises. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433. Please contact Kari Labrie room MC3-456 telephone 202-473-1001 fax 202-522-1155 email address klabrie@. Policy Research Working

TỪ KHÓA LIÊN QUAN
Đã phát hiện trình chặn quảng cáo AdBlock
Trang web này phụ thuộc vào doanh thu từ số lần hiển thị quảng cáo để tồn tại. Vui lòng tắt trình chặn quảng cáo của bạn hoặc tạm dừng tính năng chặn quảng cáo cho trang web này.