TAILIEUCHUNG - BANK LENDING AND THE TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY

In November 2004, building upon the recommendations established in the RSSS, the CPSS and the Technical Committee of IOSCO published the Recommendations for central counterparties (RCCP). The RCCP provided 15 recommendations that addressed the major types of risks faced by CCPs. A methodology for assessing a CCP’s observance of each recommendation was included in the report. In January 2009, the CPSS and the Technical Committee of IOSCO established a working group to provide guidance on the application of these recommendations to CCPs that clear OTC derivatives products and to develop a set of considerations for TRs in designing and. | Bank Lending and the Transmission of Monetary Policy Joe Peek and Eric s. Rosengren A resurgence of interest in the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy has resulted in a spate of theoretical and empirical studies. These studies have established that under certain conditions the traditional transmission mechanism for monetary policy the money view may be augmented through changes in the supply of bank loans the lending view . Because both the money view and the lending view operate through the banking sector the health of the banking system insofar as it affects bank behavior is an important factor in the transmission of monetary policy. It affects both the nature and the size of bank responses to shifts in monetary policy with particular relevance for the bank lending channel. The traditional description of monetary policy generally emphasizes the reserve requirement constraint on banks. In this story banks are an important link in the transmission of monetary policy because changes in bank reserves influence the quantity of reservable deposits held by banks. Because banks rarely hold significant excess reserves the reserve requirement constraint typically is considered to be binding at all times. However a second constraint on banks the capital constraint may be more important in accounting for the variability in the magnitude of the effect of monetary policy over time. The extent to which a capital constraint is binding unlike the reserve requirement is likely to vary Professor of Economics Boston College and Visiting Economist Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and Vice President and Economist Federal Reserve Bank of Boston respectively. The authors thank Peggy Gilligan and Leo Hsu for providing valuable research assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System. 48 Joe Peek and Eric s. Rosengren over time and across .

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