TAILIEUCHUNG - LONG TERM CHANGES IN VOTING POWER AND CONTROL STRUCTURE FOLLOWING THE UNIFICATION OF DUAL CLASS SHARES

For our study we focused on those industries where intangibles play in general a major or dominant role (general relevance of intangibles). As we want to focus on the value rele- vance of reporting on intangibles and as we want to examine in further studies the impact on stock market returns we concentrate on corporations quoted on the German capital market. Therefore, we selected the five sections „Media“, „Technology“, „Pharmaceuticals / Health Care“, „Software“ and „Telecommunications“ from the CDAX industry indices. For all of these five industries we assume an intensive use of intangibles like customer value, know. | ONDAZIONE EnI Enrico Mattei NOTA DI LAVORO Long Term Changes in Voting Power and Control Structure following the Unification of Dual Class Shares By Beni Lauterbach School of Business Administration Bar-Ilan University Yishay Yafeh School of Business Administration The Hebrew University INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS Series Editor Fausto Panunzi Long Term Changes in Voting Power and Control Structure following the Unification of Dual Class Shares By Beni Lauterbach School of Business Administration Bar-Ilan University Yishay Yafeh School of Business Administration The Hebrew University Summary We follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 Israeli companies that unified their dual-class shares in the 1990s and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First controlling shareholders offset the dilution of voting rights they incurred upon unification by 1 increasing their holdings prior to the unification ex-ante preparation and 2 by buying shares afterwards by the end of the sample period their voting power was only marginally lower than in the control sample. This suggests that marginal voting rights are important to controlling shareholders even beyond the 50 threshold. Second share unifications were not associated with much change in the identity of controlling shareholders. Third the proportion of firms affiliated with pyramidal business groups in the sample of unifying firms was lower than in the population of listed firms as a whole and not different from that in the control sample suggesting that pyramidal ownership structures did not replace dual class shares. Finally unifying firms did not exhibit a substantial improvement in their performance and valuation in comparison with the control sample. We conclude that the regulatory attempt to enforce one share-one vote yielded at best a minor improvement in corporate governance. Keywords Dual .

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