TAILIEUCHUNG - OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE

Although health economics provides a useful starting point for such analyses of coverage, the ultimate effect of a mandate is not easily reduced to, and in fact could differ from, the predicted effect of treating penalty amounts as dollar-for-dollar equivalents to subsidies. People can respond to penalties and subsidies differently and in ways that are not considered in standard health economics models. As a result, modeling structures originally designed to estimate how coverage choices could change when subsidies are offered could be insufficient for examining mandates alone or in combination with other coverage-related policies | NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE Camille Landais Pascal Michaillat Emmanuel Saez Working Paper 16526 http papers w16526 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge MA 02138 November 2010 We thank editor Daron Acemoglu George Akerlof Varanya Chaubey Raj Chetty Sanjay Chugh Peter Diamond Jordi Galí Yuriy Gorodnichenko David Gray Philipp Kircher Kory Kroft Guido Lorenzoni Albert Marcet Emi Nakamura Matthew Notowidigdo Christopher Pissarides Jón Steinsson four anonymous referees and numerous seminar participants for helpful discussions and comments. We thank Attila Lindner for outstanding research assistance. Financial support from the Center for Equitable Growth at UC Berkeley is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. 2010 by Camille Landais Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez. All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including notice is given to the source. Optimal Unemployment Insurance over the Business Cycle Camille Landais Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez NBER Working Paper No. 16526 November 2010 Revised March 2012 JEL No. E24 E32 H21 H23 ABSTRACT We use an equilibrium unemployment framework to characterize the optimal unemployment insurance UI over the business cycle. We investigate how the classical trade-off between insurance and incentives to search evolves over the business cycle. In a broad class of models the trade-off is resolved by a formula that expresses optimal UI as a function of not only usual statistics risk aversion and .

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