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Nhưng không giống như rằng đạo đức cao lý tưởng, nó imputes không có việc làm sai trái để những người làm hại các sinh vật sống về mặt đạo đức khi có âm thanh lý do để làm như vậy. | A Multi-Criterial Analysis of Moral Status 149 These principles are implicit elements of common-sense morality. This does not mean that everyone consciously uses them but rather that most of the judgements about moral status that thoughtful people make and can support with reasoned argument can be defended by appealing to one or more of these principles. None of these principles is deducible from empirical facts or from analytic truths about moral terms or concepts yet each is defensible in commonsense ways. 1. The Respect for Life Principle Living organisms are not to be killed or otherwise harmed without good reasons that do not violate principles 2-7. Like Schweitzer s ethic of Reverence for Life the Respect for Life principle treats all harms done to living things as morally undesirable other things being equal. But unlike that highly idealistic ethic it imputes no wrongdoing to those who harm living things when there are morally sound reasons for doing so. To provide for human well-being and that of the animals plants and ecosystems that are under our care we are often obliged to engage in activities that harm living things. For instance we cannot avoid causing the deaths of many common micro-organisms in the course of growing harvesting and preparing food and keeping our bodies our clothing and our dwellings tolerably clean. Since these organisms generally have no significant claim to moral status other than that they are alive and since the alternative would be to permit harm to organisms that have a stronger moral status than can be based upon mere organic life we need feel no guilt in these cases. The Respect for Life principle does not explain what counts as a sufficiently good reason for harming a living thing nor could it since the fact that something is alive tells us very little about its moral status. The strength of the reasons needed to justify harming any particular living thing depends upon additional factors specified in later principles e.g. .
